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Abstract
Critically engaging with literature on post-politics, blockchain and algorithmic governance, and drawing also on knowledge gained 
from undertaking a three-year empirical study, the purpose of this article is to better understand the transformative capacity of
government-led blockchain projects. Analysis of a diversity of empirical material, which was guided by a digital ethnography
approach, is used to support the furthering of the existing debate on the nature of the post-political as a condition and/or strategy.
Through these theoretical and empirical explorations, the article concludes that while the post-political represents a contingent
political strategy by governmental actors, it could potentially impose an algorithmically enforced post-political ‘condition’ for the
citizen. It is argued that the design, features and mechanisms of government-led projects are deliberately and strategically used to
delimit a citizens’ political agency. In order to address this scenario, we argue that there is a need not only to analyse and contribute
to the algorithmic design of blockchain projects (i.e. the affordances and constraints they set), but also to the metapolitical narrative
underpinning them (i.e. the political imaginaries underlying the various government-led projects).
Keywords blockchain, post-political, decentralization, e-government, technopolitics, prefigurative politics, digital ethnography, civic tech 
1. Introduction
A growing body of thought has begun to theoretically and 
empirically investigate the dynamics of contemporary
depoliticization and the alleged ‘disappearance of the political’.
Uniting a diverse set of opinions is the idea that “contemporary
forms of depoliticization are characterized by the erosion of
democracy and the weakening of the public sphere, as
consensual mode of governance has colonized, if not sutured,
political space” [1, p. 5]. This emerging literature across the
social sciences conceptualizes the processes as ‘post-politics’,
‘post-political’ and ‘post-democratic’ [2]–[5]. An important
debate within this highly contested sphere concerns the nature
of the post-political itself: whether it is a “condition” of
contemporary society or a “contingent political strategy”
imposed upon it to shrink political agency [6, p. 39]. Using
blockchain as a civic or political technology, that could
potentially transform political agency, as well as, political
processes, has become an oft-cited claim [7]–[9]. While there are
many empirical studies that use the lens of the post-political to
explore, for instance, governmentality [10], social enterprise [11]
or radical politics [12], we think government-led blockchain
projects provide an apt case for addressing some of the crucial
questions surrounding the post-political.
It is argued that blockchain projects personify “prefigurative
politics” [13] by design: they embody the politics and power
structures they want to enable in society. These technopolitical
systems achieve this by setting certain “affordances and 
constraints” [14, p. 726] i.e. the possible courses of action
available to an actor. Through this, such systems can influence
the behaviour, outcomes, and so forth of any individual taking
part in a political process or action within or through it. In other
words, the design of these systems prefiguratively determines
the agency actors have while using the system. As explained 
elsewhere, these contingences are deeply political, where they
are specifically set up by the designers to delimit an actor’s
political agency (anon, forthcoming) [15]. Moreover, particular 
political imaginaries guide and inform how and why these
contingencies will be set up within the system. If governments
are beginning to experiment with blockchain as a
technopolitical infrastructure to restructure governance, and 
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allegedly, alter the political agency of citizens, it becomes fruitful
to investigate why and how from a post-political perspective. In
that, the aim of this discussion paper is two-fold: first, to reflect
upon whether and how government-led blockchain projects are
politically transformative; and second, in follow on, to
contribute to existing debate on the nature of the post-political
as a condition and/or strategy.
The fundamental question this paper aims to explore is whether
all government-led technopolitical projects (blockchain or
otherwise) are inevitably confined within or structured by the
‘post-political condition’? Alternatively, is the post-political a
strategy that is being actively implemented to curtail and delimit
a citizen’s political agency, and, by effect, recentralize power
under the guise of a decentralized technopolitical system?
We begin the article by contextualizing blockchain projects in
the language of the post-political literature. After a note on 
methods, we analyse and discuss our empirical findings. In
drawing the discussion to a conclusion, we return to the
research questions, reflecting also on whether and how
blockchain projects can avoid the “post-political trap” [6].
2.	 The prefigurative post-politics of crypto-anarchists
and crypto-institutionalists
Within the blockchain space, one way of understanding the
different types of projects is by clustering them. Two higher
level clusters of blockchain projects have previously been
categorized as: crypto-anarchists and crypto-institutionalists
(anon, forthcoming) [15]. The prior cluster denotes initiatives
that use blockchain as government, while the latter use it in, for
and with government. In this article, we will focus on the latter,
crypto-institutionalists, which comprise predominantly of
government-led blockchain projects. There are estimated to be
more than 100 of such projects currently attempting to
transform governmental systems in more than 40 countries [16,
p. 1]. Moreover, IBM’s executive report claims that 9 in 10
governmental organizations will invest in blockchain in 2018
and that “a group of government organizations are embracing
blockchain technology to reduce frictions to innovation and 
information and facilitate more extensive collaboration”, which
will stimulate trust between citizens and government [17, p. 1]. 
Blockchain as, in, for and with government is, however, a highly
contestable field of study – including, for example, in academic
literature [18], online spaces (Slack teams of various projectsi),
popular media [19], governmental reports [20] and even
European Commission launched forums [21]. This
contestation, much of it surrounding blockchain’s
transformative potential, can be understood historically. Bitcoin
(whose underlying technology is blockchain), for instance, was
launched in the midst of the 2008 economic crash and 
accompanying democratic crisis, as a response to the features of
what is now commonly referred to as the ‘post-political
condition’. Bitcoin was to enable individuals to politically exit
from the dominant financial system, while blockchain became
the prospective ‘liberator’ from all other state and corporate run
institutions [22]. 
While the precise nuances of the post-political condition are
contestable, the general consensus is on the fact that the 
genuinely political has vanished [5], [23], [24] and “the
parameters of political discussion and political action have
narrowed to preclude alternatives to neoliberalism” [6, p. 33]. 
Swyngedouw, following the post-foundational theorists like
Badiou, Mouffe, Ranicière and Ž ̌izek, explains that the post-
political:
“refer to a situation in which the political – understood as a
space of contestation and antagonistic engagement – is
increasingly colonised by politics – understood as technocratic
mechanisms and consensual procedures that operate within an
unquestioned framework of representative democracy, free
market economics, and cosmopolitan liberalism” [1, p. 6]
While this widely shared belief is useful in grasping the general
idea, it is the subtleties of post-political conceptualizations
which arguably provide a more fertile ground to investigate
blockchain projects. Mouffe believes that the hegemonic
economic regime has not completely obliterated the political,
but rather “repressed” it [5, p. 18]. She believes that there is an
absence or lack of political channels that can challenge the
“hegemony of the neoliberal model of globalisation” [1, p. 12]. 
For Rancière, it is not repression, but rather, three types of
“disavowal” that explain the post-political: archi-politics (closed 
communitarian groups such as nationalists), para-politics
(where political conflict is reformulated to fit in the
representative democratic system), and meta-politics (where
politics is reduced to systemic governing of things rather than
people) [25, pp. 60–95]. Ž ̌izek adds another layer, by explaining
that politics is not merely repressed or disavowed in post-
politics, but “foreclosed”; it asks us to “leave old ideological
divisions behind and confront new issues” [26, p. 188]. In other 
words, for Ž ̌izek, the contemporary political system effectively 
places the genuinely political outside of the realm of
possibilities.
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In sum, we can see most of the post-foundational theorists
believe that exercise of genuine political agency can only be
from outside of the dominant institutional setting. Similar to the
conceptualization of blockchain projects, the global socio-
economic system seems to prefiguratively embody values and 
features of the post-political condition: global consensus,
economic logic and depoliticization. In the language of
blockchain studies, this could be rephrased as depoliticization
by design. In any techno-social system that is depoliticised by
design, the “potentialities and plurality of agencies are reduced 
to the heroic, anti-heroic and demagogic” [6, p. 36]. For
instance, in the blockchain space, crypto-anarchists consider
Bitcoin as a technological ‘hero’, which (debatably) operates
outside of dominant institutional systems of finance and 
economics [27]. 
In fact, blockchain projects are polarized between those 
creating parallel systems outside the dominant institutional
setting (crypto-anarchists) and those providing efficiency gains
within it (crypto-institutionalists) [28, p. 4]. Though very
different political imaginaries guide these projects, both groups
seem to depoliticise in some way. They share an appeal to, and 
utilization of, blockchain’s oft-cited design principles: access,
disintermediation, decentralization, empowerment and equality
[7]. For instance, Bitcoin, as global cryptocurrency, is
disintermediated from traditional intermediaries of the financial
system such as central banks and stock exchanges. However, its
so-called technological hero is an algorithm, which effectively
depoliticizes its economy by automating it. There is no agent
(governmental or otherwise) politically responsible for its fair
functioning (at least, not yet).ii Similarly, government-led
blockchain projects that decentralize services, or
disintermediate processes, by effect, also depoliticize them in
that they ‘foreclose’ any possibility of an exercise of (political)
agency. Hypothetically, by automating a governance service like
a petition system using blockchain, it could be argued that the
political responsibility of the service is handed over to the
algorithm. However, the political power could and would
remain with the government in two ways: first, the government
chooses the affordances and constraints and therefore, delimits
an individual’s agency by design; second, it leaves itself an
affordance to choose or veto certain decisions.
This leads us back to our main question: with regards to
government-led blockchain projects, is the post-political a
societal condition or a politically contingent strategy to
recentralize power?
3.	 Methods: digital ethnography and experts
The empirical data used in this article is predominantly the
outcome of a three-year period of immersion in the spaces and 
practices of blockchain initiatives of the first author. Following
a digital ethnography approach, we acknowledged that the
“digital has become a part of the material, sensory and social
worlds that we inhabit, and the implications there are for
ethnographic research” [29, p. 7]. The socio-political and 
innovation worlds of blockchain are, in part, so fast-paced 
because of their hybrid nature: geographical, temporal and 
practical obstacles are less of a hinderance because of the
features and possibilities of the digital. Any developments
within the field, whether narrative building, political actions,
decision making, or planning, take place both online and offline.
Hence, only a methodological approach that is responsive to 
this online-offline dynamic is appropriate and adequate for
research in this space.
For this research, we began to search for the social worlds
where blockchain innovation for political change was taking
place. Unruh expounded that the concept of the “social world”
refers to “a form of social organization which cannot be
accurately delineated by spatial, territorial, formal or
membership boundaries” but instead, by lines and channels of
communication and interaction [30, p. 271]. Hence, as digital
ethnographers, we entered the hybrid (online and offline) social
world of blockchain innovation to understand the
communication norms, rules, networks, behaviors, activity
infrastructures and operational structures. The socio-political
worlds of blockchain and civic tech were located on team
collaboration platforms such as Slack, online forums such as 
Reddit, blogs, social media platforms, conferences, Meetups,
GitHub projects and hackathons. Their depth,
interrelationships, networks and infrastructure were vastly
diverse. While there are many purely online data sources used,
this did not replace gathering data from institutional actors and 
experts that were only accessible in-person. Different methods
were used to collect data across the different sites, but were
guided by: (i) everyday immersion routines and participant
observation (following debates daily); and (ii) participatory
action (starting and contributing to online debates, conducting
workshops, participating in hackathons and other long-term
events). Data used for reflection was mainly in the form of:
a)	 Field notes and diary reflections: theoretical and praxis-
based reflections engaging in many spontaneous
conversations at blockchain events with practitioners, 
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figureheads, government officials, coders, researchers and
activists.
b)	 Online immersion routine (participant observation): daily
and weekly involvement in forums and working groups;
mapping and following the debates.
i)	 6 team collaboration platforms (unnamed) and 4
Reddit Forums
c)	 Digital social archiving: data (mainly in the form of linked
pages) formed visual mind-maps with descriptions and 
storyboards on software such as Pearltrees and Raindrop
which are open for the public collaboration and
recommendations.
d)	 Experts: reflexive and tailored interview methods (from
semi-structured to informal) for consulting experts;
recorded in audio and/or non-verbatim notes. Twenty-five
semi-structured and informal expert interviews were used 
for reflection in this article. They were conducted at
numerous events, meetings and forums occurring between
September 2016 to August 2019. While the names of the
experts are kept anonymous at their request, the
geographical location of the events are included:
i)	 EU Parliament ‘spotlight on blockchain’ and relevant
European Commission working groups at the Week of
Regions and Cities (Brussels)
ii)	 EU Blockchain Observatory discussion groups
(Brussels)
iii)	 Blockchain Pilots Netherlands (meetings) (The Hague,
Amsterdam)
iv)	 Dutch Blockchain Coalition (meetings)(Amsterdam)
v)	 Blockchain events in Amsterdam (Bitcoin Wednesday
and misc. Meetups)
vi)	 Blockchain Live London – GovTech stream
vii) Welsh Council for Voluntary Action (meetings and
workshop) (Cardiff)
viii) Satori Labs, (Cardiff)
ix)	 Ex civil servants in Welsh Government (Cardiff)
x)	 Welsh Government Chief Technology Office (Cardiff)
xi)	 Decode (EU project – Amsterdam)
xii) D-Cent (EU project – Amsterdam)
xiii) P2P Models (ERC Project – Spain/Online)
All this data was used in concert with an analytical frame
comprising of three core themes: blockchain and government,
post-political theory and algorithmic governance. For field 
notes, interviews and diary reflections: open coding according
to grounded theory comprised of ‘conceptual labelling’ which
later developed into the two clusters of blockchain innovation
(crypto-institutionalists and crypto-anarchists). These higher-
level categories were used to find relationships within and 
between projects leading to an abstract variation of axial coding,
on paper. Furthermore, the most interesting data to analyse was
nuances and divisions between the different social worlds of
innovators which would rarely interact with each other. The use
of the same terms and language (such as decentralization,
disintermediation, access etc.) with completely different
meanings added a layer of complexity which prohibited us from
using traditional forms of coding. Interviewees and forum/team
participants were asked to reflect on patterns and categories to
validate and cross-check the inferences.
4.	 Discussion: the empirical puzzle of post-political
blockchains
In their critical commentary of post-political thought, Beveridge
and Koch explain how “there is a problematic understanding of
the relation between the ‘political’, process of depoliticization
and the empirical effects of depoliticization” [6, p. 34]. As
asserted earlier, the ‘truly political’ supposedly lies outside of the
dominant institutional setting, and thus, only projects that
subvert the established system merit this status. Accordingly,
the ‘political’ is seen as an ontological category that constitutes,
defines and structures ‘politics’, the everyday conflicts and 
struggles of contemporary society. ‘Politics’, is then, the ontic
appearance of the ‘political’. Accordingly, if these two concepts
“do not belong to the same analytic register”, it becomes very
hard to empirically assess “the radical or emancipatory quality
of actually existing politics by comparing it to philosophical
arguments about a distinct definition of the political as an
ontological category” [6, p. 35]. Instead, they argue that “post-
politics or depoliticization is an empirical puzzle and should be
treated accordingly” [6, p. 36]. The following discussion uses
government-led blockchain projects as the point of entry to
help decrypt the empirical puzzle of the post-political.
4.1. Shrinking political agency by algorithm
There is a growing body of literature that refers to algorithmic
governance as a technological mode of governance that leads to
the formulation of political practices [31]–[34]. These scholars
engage with the strategies that lead to new forms of decision-
making and governance through algorithms. They identify how
code, data and technical infrastructure (software) are core
features underlying the new modes of governance [35]–[37]. 
These studies claim and explain how algorithms form new
affordances and constraints, new modulations of command and 
control, and new processes for political engagement and 
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subjectivation. Ontic politics, in this domain, is the study of how
a citizen’s political agency is produced within an algorithmic
institutional setting. Critical theorists in this field align
themselves with post-foundational theorists, claiming that
algorithmic governance essentially entails the depoliticization or
subjectivation of the political sphere. For instance, Rouvroy
claims that algorithmic governmentality constitutes the 
disappearance of the political subject [34], where individual
agency is subjugated by data metrics such as norm, consensus
drivers and protocols.
As Lessig elaborates, algorithmic governance signals the
ascendance of technopolitical infrastructure over normative and 
judicial infrastructure [38]. Accordingly, “code has progressively
established itself as the predominant way to regulate the
behaviour” [39]. With blockchain and smart contracts, some
scholars see a shift from ‘code is law’ (code has the effect of
law) to ‘law is code’ (law is actively being defined as code). While
the judicial system is enforced “ex-post” (after the event)
through state intervention, algorithmic systems enforce it “ex
ante” (before the event) through code [39]. This sort of “power 
through the algorithm” [40] prefiguratively determines what is
and is not allowed, where the government could remove the
possibility of disobedience altogether [41]. For instance, several
governmentsiii are experimenting with a land registry system on
the blockchain, which would use smart contracts to “increase
transparency, speed and trust in property transactions” [42]. 
Taking the case of Georgia, the National Agency of Public
Registry (NAPR) regulates all property transactions in that the
blockchain is “private with regards to who can validate the
transactions” [43, p. 19]. Though the transparency of this
system leads to security and reliability of land titles, it also
implicitly means that the only actors with an affordance to 
commit fraud is NAPR itself. A case study by the JRC shows
that the project “does not provide any disintermediation of
organizations nor replaces any existing system” [43, p. 20]. 
Thus, it is safe to assume that while political disobedience is
prefiguratively constrained by the algorithm, political power
remains with the same actors. Political power is effectively
recentralised under the pretence of a decentralized governance
system.
Data arising from our own empirical research further supports
the claim that most crypto-institutional projects have similar
aims. One interviewer explained that blockchain from their
government’s perspective is not experimented with to alter
power relations or decision-making procedures, but rather
“automate” processes that no longer require “politicians to be
responsible”. Another respondent reiterated “efficiency gains
and cost-cutting” are the primary reasons for experimenting
with blockchain, rather than “altering political agency of
citizens”. Similarly, our interactions and immersion in the world
of ‘GovTech’ (technology for (e-)government) at conferences
and online spaces, highlighted analogous themes of ‘handing
over responsibility’, ‘algorithm-ing’, simplifying and enhancing
political processes. These intentions and themes, albeit not
always explicitly, nor with bad intentions, pointed in the
direction of depoliticization as an active strategy employed by
governmental actors.
4.2. Meta-political reduction to economic order building
Earlier, we mentioned how the dominant economic regime has
repressed, disavowed or foreclosed the political from being
actualized in the post-political condition [5], [25], [26]. Similarly,
we can note that post-politics in “institutional terms is defined 
by the reduction of the political to the economic – the creation
of ‘welcoming business environment’, which inspires ‘investor
confidence’” [1, p. 8]. A prime example of this logic is Estonia’s
e-residency program [44], [45]. Estonia is regarded as the
pioneer in e-government leveraging blockchain and other
emerging technologies for managing public affairs. Within their
multiple programs, e-residency is “essentially a commercial
initiative” that functions as an “international passport” to the
virtual business world for anyone to carry out commercial
activities [46]. “Like citizens and residents of Estonia, e-
residents receive a government-issued digital ID and full access
to Estonia’s public e-services. This enables them to establish a
trusted EU business with all the tools needed to conduct
business globally” [47]. In this scheme Estonian authorities hold 
and control data, and arguably use e-residency as a “tool for
exerting power as knowledge” [48]. We gathered data to
understand the affordances and constraints that the e-residency
would impose and how it would regulate the behaviour of an
individual. This data was tabulated and fit into the patterns
identified within the crypto-institutional space. Furthermore, it
also offered cross-validation for the categories assigned to
identify differing political imaginaries [15].
Our expert interviews and conversations with crypto-
institutionalists, as well as document analysis of vision
statements and white papers, show how the Estonian digital
project allows for an efficient acceleration of global economic
order building. Interviewees were presented prompts about e-
Estonia (and other crypto-institutional systems) and were asked
to reflect and debate these statements. These corroborated 
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patterns identified from the immersion and digital ethnography
of the crypto-institutional space. We found that the Estonian
experiments fit neatly within the category of crypto-institutional 
projects where there is a recentralization of power through data
management. Moreover, decision making power and political
processes are relatively unchanged, albeit more efficient and 
transparent. The project may claim to transform political agency
of the citizen, yet, our findings failed to demonstrate any
systematic way this was taking place. With regards to the
changing role of the citizen or resident and enable more
participation, our findings resonated with others claiming that
citizens are depoliticized and transformed into passive
“consumers” of governance services [49]. We learnt that
majority of the ‘benefits’ for e-residents are economic, and, as
such, allow an easy, reliable and geographically neutral entry into
the EU economy through Estonia.
The Estonian example shows us how a national government
can use a post-political blockchain strategy to simplify
bureaucratic procedures, open up new markets, and create
global consensus. Furthermore, it opens up its borders for
business, thereby depoliticizing many local economies where
place-based norms, cultures and political structures would have
inhibited particular businesses from forming. Contrarily, it can
also be said that by allowing detachment from the immediate
geopolitical boundaries, it also allows an escape from place-
based prejudices, politico-economic structures and constricting
norms. While interviewing officials from two national
governments (Wales and The Netherlands), we found that the
intention of both their offices to use blockchain was indeed to
create efficiency and speed up bureaucratic processes. Similarly,
the delivery of a workshop at a national third-sector institution
(anonymous, in Wales) on collaboration through the blockchain
resulted in a Q&A session on the potential efficiency gains for
internal management via the blockchain. During another
workshop, an expert running several blockchain pilots
explained how it takes a lot of cross-departmental collaboration
and “traditional project work” to actually implement solutions
which would change “anything political”. Emblematically, the
JRC even states that “contrary to how it is often portrayed,
blockchain, so far, is neither transformative nor even disruptive
for the public sector” [43, p. 7]. 
Crypto-institutionalists show us how it is possible to utilize the
hype around blockchain’s transformative potential to reinforce 
and enhance economic order building and representative
democracy. As Atzori points out, democratic transformation
cannot simply be “consensus ex post, typical of decentralized
networks” since this would require “adequate quality and 
extension of participation, consensus ex ante and legitimacy of
procedures, protection of minority rights, freedom of
participants, and again equal opportunities of access to decision-
making” [50, p. 58]. Furthermore, it could be argued that even
governments that “cluster around specific interests and 
temporarily agree on a common set of (algorithmic) rules” [50,
p. 58], depoliticize the space for transformative change. Most of
the crypto-institutional strategies and rhetoric researched for
this article are used to not only reinforce the processes of
depoliticization of the socio-economic apparatus, but also, to
structurally bound citizens from disobeying or opting for a
political exit [28], [51].
4.3. The absence of collaboration in the ‘political’
The research underpinning this article began by examining the
different citizen-led movements that were working to create and 
experiment with technologies that transformed the democratic
political process. Their efforts were perceived as being rooted 
in Europe’s democratic deficit [52], lack of participation and 
collaboration in governance [53], and more generally in political
apathy towards government. The radical municipalist
movement [54] launched city-platforms for collaborative
democracy, participatory budgeting, open consultation and 
direct democracy projects. In an earlier article, we called this
phenomenon ‘place-based civic tech’: citizen engagement
technology co-designed by local government, civil society and 
global volunteers [55]. We noted that “combining online tools
with offline collaborative practices presents a unique
opportunity for decentralization of power and decision-
making” [55]. These initiatives attempt to transform the
apparatus of the dominant system by working with it. In the
blockchain space, we see some of the same rhetoric of the civic
tech movement, but a completely different typology of projects.
None of the projects in Jun’s extensive survey of government-
led blockchain projects, for example, explicitly leads to a change
in democratic processes or participation [16, pp. 3–6]. 
Conversely, as another study asserts, blockchain experiments
can even enable a sort of “technological populism” by 
exploiting “the rhetoric of empowering the disenfranchised 
through decentralized decision-making process, enabling
anonymous of transactions, dehumanizing trust (trust in
computation rather than trust in humans and institutions)” [56]. 
While carrying out our digital ethnography, by being involved
in the online and offline social worlds, carrying out interviews,
and attending various digitally mediated events, one of the
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predominant themes we noted was the complete separation of
the crypto-anarchist projects (i.e. blockchain as government) 
from the crypto-institutional projects (i.e. blockchain in, for and 
with government). The paradox of projects operating in parallel
planes sheds light on the power of the post-political condition.
As asserted earlier, the post-political casts true political agency
only on those acts that operate outside and beyond the
dominant institutional setting. From this perspective, all crypto-
anarchist projects would be genuinely political as they attempt
to create new worlds as opposed to work within the established 
system. Mouffe would, we anticipate, disagree with this
approach explaining that strategies to overcome hegemonic
forces must engage with “visible nodes of power, which
ultimately are apparent in existing institutions of politics” [6, p.
37]. If any blockchain approach fails in doing so, it denies the
political potential and “reproduces the very post political
condition it wants to attack – by not directly engaging with the
institutions of power through which it operates” [6, p. 37]. 
Two of our interviewees voiced the opinion that blockchain
practitioners have several lessons to learn from the ethos and 
functioning of civic technologists. Another one of our
interviewees, who piloted several crypto-institutional projects,
lamented about how actors from both sides of the spectrum
wholly refuse any form of collaboration or cross-learning.
Furthermore, this interviewee stated how some of the most
fascinating and feasible political technologies will not make it to
the mainstream precisely because of this absence in
collaboration. Whereas we see the radical municipalist
movement creating a “translocal geography of political action”
[55, p. 12] in collaboration with local government, crypto-
anarchists such as BitNation or Democracy Earth, seemingly
rather create one without any established nodes of power [44],
[57]. With regards to collaboration with these nodes, some
scholars agree that conceptualizing the post-political as a
‘condition’ is politically disempowering, since it “denies the
political status of less explosive forms of contestation” [1, p.
18]. It is through such experimentation that “new political
formations will emerge” [11, p. 190].
4.4. The strategy of structures over agency
If the post-political is a condition that contemporary society
endures, who are the agents that create and maintain it?
According to most post-political thinkers, it would be the
hegemonic forces of capital or the structures of representative
democracy. This approach proposes that:
‘Any transition initiative and governance arrangement are
inevitably confined within – or dictated by – neoliberal and 
financialization market logics, which themselves resist their own
transition. Institutional structures and socially innovative
groups which do not – or insufficiently – challenge the larger
political economy that frames social services…will constantly
find themselves interacting in post-political, consensus-oriented 
governance arenas’ [58]
In the context of blockchain, it would be the algorithm that
creates the institutional structures which would, or would not,
challenge the larger political economy. Furthermore, this shows 
how governmental agents actively design and implement the
algorithm, which then creates and enforces contingencies upon
its users. Accordingly, we would tend to agree with the critics
who consider that post-politics as a field of study “is dominated 
by description of meta-level discourses and ultimately relies on
the analysis of structures rather than agencies” [6, p. 37]. From
our research, we learnt that there is a lot of misinformation
about the mysterious closed-door decision making and 
unchanging political agendas of both crypto-anarchists and 
crypto-institutionalist blockchain initiatives. In fact, any
ontological claim about the ‘political’ when it comes to the
blockchain space negates the plurality and reflexivity of the
agencies that operate in the field. Given that business lobbies,
banks, national governments and other institutional agents
heavily influence the development of the field, we learnt
through our interviews that a lot of the projects are unaware of
what could be called their ‘post-political’ strategies.
When it comes to a using blockchain in, for and with
government, the two different layers of agency are easier to
identify than in the judicial-democratic system. There are those
who create the technical design of the system i.e. governmental
actors that set the affordances and constraints, and those that
participate within this system of contingencies i.e. the citizen or
user. While it could be argued that the affordances and 
constraints are structured by the post-political condition, in this
early stage of blockchain experimentation, it is clear that it is
being used as a strategy to recentralize power. As one of our
interviewees put it, “there’s no way government is going to let
this be disruptive…ceding power requires someone to cede
power to, and it’s not going to be an algorithm”. Our data
analysis pointed in the direction that though the post-political
may be a strategy for the governmental actors, it is an
unchangeable, and indeed ex ante set of rules for the citizens i.e.
a condition.
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5.	 Concluding remarks: can blockchain avoid the “post-
political trap”?
Our main research question for this discussion paper was
whether all crypto-institutionalist projects are structured by the
so-called ‘post-political condition’ or whether the post-political
is it used a contingent political strategy to delimit citizens’
political agency. Drawing on the above discussion of findings,
our conclusion, in response to this question is that the post-
political is a contingent strategy employed by crypto-
institutionalists to depoliticize various politico-economic 
processes. However, perhaps a more troubling finding is that it
a government-imposed blockchain architecture has the
potential to create an algorithmically enforced post-political
condition for the citizen. In this scenario, there will not even be
the symbolic room we have in contemporary representative
democracy for the ‘political moment’, let alone contest the
design of the process. Our analysis suggests that this strategy of
post-political is underpinned by an almost path-dependent idea
of the recentralization of power. The above cited interviewee’s
comment “ceding power requires someone to cede power to”
helps us, however, to outline some modest suggestions of how
blockchain projects can avoid the post-political trap.
The Radical Municipalist and civic tech movement give us one
example of how a translocal political network and local 
government can be operationalized to re-politicize some aspects
and features of the socio-political system. In Madrid, for
example, there was a self-organized and self-managing group of
citizens, along with local government officials that eagerly 
accept the responsibility of processes such as participatory 
budgets, citizen assemblies, random election [59], [60] and 
founding the “Madrid Citizens’ Council” [61]. The political, in
this space, is constantly being reconfigured and redefined to
incorporate new affordances for the citizen; in the case of
Madrid, for self-government. If the political imaginary
underlying crypto-institutional projects continues to feature
depoliticization, individualism, order building and global
consensus, it becomes hard to imagine any technopolitical
infrastructure enabling any sort of radical political
transformation, at least with regards to a citizens’ political
agency. The fact, though, that we are still far from mainstream
implementation of blockchain in government creates a space of
hope by providing the opportunity to influence the design and 
implementation of the different solutions.
If we accept that blockchain, as a general-purpose technology,
does have the capacity to be politically transformative, to redraw
boundaries of access, empower the citizenry, create new forms
of organization and re-politicise the economy, it becomes
imperative for researchers, activists and governmental
practitioners to collaborate in order to code new values into the
architecture of these systems. Our interviewees all express the
difficulty of fostering and scaling collaboration between
different parties, explaining that it is necessary to be realistic
about moving forward. Reflecting on our individual
responsibilities and agency, it is necessary that we, as researchers
and practitioners, not only analyse and contribute to the design
of the crypto-institutional algorithms (i.e. the affordances and 
constraints they set), but also the meta-political narrative
underpinning them (i.e. the political imaginaries underlying the
various projects). Without investigating and influencing both,
we fall into the post-political trap which focusses on structures
and not agencies. One of the strategies that we explored during
our research that ontologically reconfigured ‘the political’ was
the collaborative effort through the implementation of new
‘politics’ in the Radical Municipalist Movement (where citizens
collaborated with the local governments and global group of
volunteers to enable a translocal geography of political action).
As Swyngedouw and Wilson exert in ending their book, the
post-political conclusion is not an “invitation to ditch forms of
institutional and political organization…it calls for a new
beginning in terms of thinking through what institutional forms
are required at what scale and what forms of political
organization are adequate to achieve this” [62, p. 309]. 
It is widely held that the politics and political imaginaries of
blockchain require urgent cross-disciplinary attention to guide
both conceptualization and experimentation [50], [63]–[68]. 
This discussion paper is a product of our interest in analysing
blockchain in, with and for government through a post-political
lens, tying together literature in blockchain studies and 
algorithmic governance spaces to post-political and post-
foundational theory. Continuing to pursue the connections
between these bodies of literature and practice together opens
up an extensive research agenda regarding both the future of
blockchain and study of the post-politics.
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i Slack teams of Democracy Earth, Ashoka, Consul, Decidim and several others
which requested for anonymity iii India, Sweden, U.K., Ghana among others are launching pilots and experiments.
For instance, refer to [69]. ii In blockchain studies, there is a growing body of literature around algorithmic
governance. This is also one of the reasons why there is urgent call for regulation
within the blockchain space, particularly with regard to cryptocurrencies.
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